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UNITED STATES V. JACKSON: UNIFORM STANDARDS FOR
DEPARTURE FROM THE FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES
I. INTRODUCTION
When the United States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines)' went
into effect on November 1, 1987,2 they produced sweeping changes in
the federal sentencing system. These changes created a need for stan-
dards to govern departure from the Guidelines and a need for sentenc-
ing decisions to be explained. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed both issues in United States v. Jackson.3 In Jackson, the court
applied a limited reasonableness standard that required the trial court
judge to adhere to the structure of the Guidelines when sentencing
outside the preset ranges of the Guidelines.4 Then, to aid the appellate
courts in applying this standard, the Tenth Circuit required the trial
court to supply a detailed description of its reasons for departure and
degree of departure. 5 Other circuit courts have applied different stan-
dards governing degree of departure from the Guidelines. These varied
standards threaten the goal of uniformity announced by Congress
6
when it established the Guidelines.
Implementation of the Guidelines also affected the role of plea
agreements in sentencing decisions. In Jackson, a plea agreement was
arranged and the court set the initial sentence prior to accepting the
Guidelines. 7 One year later, the United States Supreme Court forced
adherence to the Guidelines by rendering them constitutional in Mis-
tretta v. United States.8 On appeal, in light of Mistretta, the case was re-
manded for resentencing pursuant to the Guidelines. 9 On remand, the
trial court chose to depart from the Guidelines and the defendant again
appealed, resulting in the case that is the subject of this Comment.' 0
The confusion in this case stems from the trial court's desire to give
weight to the circumstances surrounding the crime in making its sen-
tencing decision. Throughout this process, however, the court appears
1. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL (1990) [hereinafter
U.S.S.G.].
2. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, at 1.1.
3. 921 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1990).
4. Id. at 993.
5. Id.
6. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, at 1.2.
7. Jackson, 921 F.2d at 987. After the Guidelines were implemented, many courts
refused to adopt them on constitutional grounds. See infra notes 65-68 and accompanying
text.
8. 488 U.S. 361 (1989). This Supreme Court case held that the-Guidelines were
constitutional, which bound all federal courts to use the Guidelines in sentencing. See
infra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
9. Jackson, 921 F.2d at 987.
10. Id. at 987-88.
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to have ignored the changed role of plea bargaining under the new
system.
Part I of this Comment briefly recounts the history of federal sen-
tencing practices. Part II describes the facts, procedural history, and ra-
tionale of the Jackson case. Part III discusses the implications ofJackson
for the Tenth Circuit and the federal systems. Part IV provides conclud-
ing remarks.
II. A HISTORY OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
A. The Pre-Guideline Era
For the greater part of the twentieth century, federal sentencing
practice was unguided, 11 and sentencing judges generally enjoyed
broad discretion. 12 With a few exceptions, 13 the judge's discretion was
only limited by statutory maximum terms. 14 These maximums were not
very restrictive. For example, the federal bank robbery statute author-
ized imprisonment for anywhere from zero to twenty-five years. 15 The
judge could also grant probation for any offense not punishable by life
imprisonment or death. 16
In determining the sentence that a criminal actually would serve,
the court also considered the effect of parole and "good time" stat-
utes. 17 Under the parole system, a criminal could be released after serv-
ing one-third of the actual sentence.18 In addition, "good time" statutes
allowed a further reduction in the sentence, for good time served. 19 Pa-
role, like unguided sentencing, was based on a theory of rehabilita-
tion.20 Under this theory, both the judge and the parole officer were
required to assess the offender's amenability to rehabilitation. 2 1 Since
evaluation of the criminal's character was necessary and the trial court
"sees more and senses more than the appellate court,"' 22 the sentencing
decision was seldom disturbed on review if it was within the statutory
11. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 363.
12. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446-47 (1972) (a federal trial judge gener-
ally has wide discretion in determining sentence); United States v. Wylie, 625 F.2d 1371,
1379 (9th Cir. 1980) (sentencing disparity is not improper if sentences are within statutory
limits); United States v. Cardi, 519 F.2d 309, 311-12 (7th Cir. 1975) (district court's sen-
tence will not be disturbed on appeal except on a plain showing of abuse).
13. "Some crimes, however, carry with them statutorily mandated minimum terms,
and some crimes even require the imposition of a fixed term." Stanley J. Roszkowski,
Sentencing Provisions and Considerations in the Federal System, 13 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 621, 622
(1982).
14. Id.
15. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1988) (sentencing provisions not amended after the original
1948 enactment).
16. Roszkowski, supra note 13, at 625.
17. Id. at 622.
18. 18 U.S.C. § 4205(a) (repealed 1984).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 4161 (repealed 1984).
20. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 363. Justice Blackmun's opinion began by summarizing the
history of federal sentencing.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 364.
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limits. 23 Thus, a three-tiered sentencing structure was created. Con-
gress defined the maximums; the judge fixed the sentences according to
statutory ranges; and the parole board determined the actual duration of
incarceration. 24 This structure created a system of checks on federal ju-
dicial sentencing power.
25
Prosecutors eventually became part of this system by virtue of their
plea bargaining power.26 Plea bargaining allowed a prosecutor to
negotiate a guilty plea with the defendant.27 This was and continues to
be a common practice. Approximately eighty-five percent of all federal
criminal convictions result from guilty pleas. 28 As part of his or her
plea bargaining power, a prosecutor could dismiss or reduce charges
against the defendant in exchange for a guilty plea.29 As a check
on this prosecutorial sentencing power, the judge could impose any sen-
tence within statutory, limits, regardless of the prosecutor's
recommendation.
30
Even though numerous checks were in place, serious disparities ex-
isted in sentencing practices. 5 ' To resolve this problem Congress at-
tempted several reforms,3 2 which culminated in the Sentencing Reform
23. United States v. Main, 598 F.2d 1086, 1094 (7th Cir.) (sentence within statutory
limits not subject to appellate review unless sentencing judge relied on inaccurate infor-
mation), cert. denied, Main v. United States, 444 U.S. 943 (1979); United States v. Cardi, 519
F.2d 309, 311-12 (7th Cir. 1975) (sentence will not be disturbed on appeal except on a
plain showing of abuse); Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431 (1974) (sentence
unreviewable if within statutory limits and no showing of discretion abuse or inaccurate
information); United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972) (a sentence within statu-
tory limits is generally not subject to review).
24. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 364-65. See United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 190
(1979) (Congress entrusted release determinations to the Parole Commission and not to
the courts); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949) (the ultimate termination of
an indeterminate sentence may be decided by a non-judicial agency).
25. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 365.
26. Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutors' Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. Cm. L. REV. 50
(1968).
27. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(1):
(e) PLEA AGREEMENTS PROCEDURE. (1) In general. The attorney for the government
and the attorney for the defendant or the defendant when acting pro se may en-
gage in discussions with a view toward reaching an agreement that, upon the en-
tering of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a charged offense or to lesser or
related offense, the attorney for the government will do any of the following:
(A) move for dismissal of other charges; or
(B) make a recommendation, or agree not to oppose the defendant's re-
quest, for a particular sentence, with the understanding that such recommen-
dation or request shall not be binding upon the court; or
(C) agree that a specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of the case.
The court shall not participate in any such discussions.
28. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL SEN-
TENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 48 (June 18, 1987).
29. Id.
30. STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND FEDERAL SENTENCING
REFORM, 10-11 (Report for the Federal Judicial Center, 1979).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Wylie, 625 F.2d 1371, 1379 (9th Cir. 1980) (two co-
conspirators with identical criminal histories received different sentences after being con-
victed of the same conspiracy).
32. In 1958 Congress attempted to establish sentencing standards by creating judicial
sentencing institutes and joint councils. 28 U.S.C. § 334 (1988). In 1976 Congress
adopted the United States Parole Board guidelines, which established sentencing ranges.
18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4218 (repealed 1984).
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Act of 1984 (Act).33 The Act recited the Congressional goals of promot-
ing fairness and reducing sentencing disparities while maintaining flexi-
bility for individualized sentencing.5 4 To achieve these ambitious goals,
Congress established the United States Sentencing Commission (Com-
mission)3 5 and instructed it to promulgate guidelines for federal courts
to use in determining criminal sentences.3 6 The Guidelines were inau-




The Guidelines articulate the goals of "proportionality" and "uni-
formity" in sentencing.3 8 To achieve these goals, the Commission cre-
ated a grid system based on the offender's criminal history
characteristics and the offense characteristics.3 9 The criminal history
categories form the horizontal axis and the offense levels form the verti-
cal axis. This grid system creates "boxes," each of which is assigned a
narrow range of sentences. Where the Guidelines call for imprison-
ment, the maximum term of sentence does not exceed the minimum
term of sentence by more than twenty-five percent. 40 Thus, criminals
with similar criminal histories, who are charged with the same offense,
will be given sentences that differ by no more than twenty-five percent.
The Guidelines provide instructions for selecting the proper of-
fense and criminal history categories. The Commission created a point
system to apply to offense and criminal history characteristics. 4 1 For the
criminal history portion, point values are assigned to previous convic-
tions based on criteria such as length of sentence, age at sentencing,
type of crime and the similarity of the past crime to the current crime.
The points are then totaled to determine the proper criminal history
category.
For the offense levels, the Commission wrestled with the question
of whether to use the real offense or the charged offense and finally
adopted a combination of the two choices. 4 2 The Commission supplied
a list of general base offenses, which are determined by the charged of-
fense. Within each base offense it listed specific offense characteristics,
33. Pub. L. No. 98-473 tit. II §§ 211-238,98 Stat. 1987-2034 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586, 3601-3625, 3661-3673, 3742
(1988)).
34. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1988). These policy ideas were reworded to "uniform-
ity" and "proportionality" by the United States Sentencing Commission. U.S.S.G., supra
note 1, at 1.2.
35. 28 U.S.C. § 991 (1988).
36. Id. § 994.
37. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, at 2.1.
38. Id. at 1.2.
39. Id. at 1.1.
40. Id.
41. Id. §§ 4AI.I - 4A1.3.
42. Id. at 1.5. The real offense is defined as the defendant's actual conduct, regardless
of the charges for which he or she was indicted or convicted.
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which are determined by the real offense. The specific offense charac-
teristics are used to adjust the base offense.4 3 Yet, the use of real of-
fense characteristics is limited. Under the Guidelines, a court is not
permitted to consider real conduct that is not articulated in the specific
offense characteristics. 4 4 It may, however, consider the real offense
characteristics, or "what really happened," when it is considering a de-
parture from the Guidelines.
45
The Commission created forty-three offense levels, which include
all crimes from petty offenses to first degree murder.4 6 Only six crimi-
nal history categories were created.4 7 Criminal history category VI is
open-ended, including all criminal histories with a total of thirteen or
more points.48 Under a strict reading of the Guidelines, a criminal with
fifty criminal history points would be classified in the sixth category.
2. Provisions for Departure
The sentencing statute allows a court to depart from the guidelines
only upon a showing of "an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a
kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sen-
tencing Commission in formulating the Guidelines that should result in
a sentence different from that described." 4 9 The Commission expected
departures to be rare, since it had taken into account the factors that
made a significant difference in pre-Guidelines sentencing practices. 50
In practice, a judge may consider departure from the Guidelines above
the sixth category.
3. Provisions for Plea Agreements
A proper sentence is determined by a combination of the prosecu-
tor's plea bargaining power and the judge's power to order the actual
duration of incarceration. Both are important and inseparable functions
in the overall sentencing process. 5 1 Congress recognized this when it
instructed the Commission to include plea bargaining in the Guide-
lines. 5 2 The Commission honored this instruction by devoting a section
43. Id.
44. Stephen G. Breyer & Kenneth R. Feinberg, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Dia-
logue, 26 GRIM L. BuLL. 5, 23 (1990).
45. Id.
46. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, at § 5A.
47. Id. §§ 4A1.I - 4A1.3.
48. Id.
49. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1990).
50. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, at 1.6.
51. See FED. R. GRIM. P. ll(e)(1), supra note 27; Schulhofer, supra note 30; Albert W.
Alschuler, Departures and Plea Agreements Under the Sentencing Guidelines, 117 F.R.D. 459
(1988); Alschuler, supra note 26; Breyer & Feinberg, supra note 44; StephenJ. Schulhofer
& Ilene H. Nagel, Negotiated Pleas Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The First Fifteen
Months, 27 AM. GRIM. L. REv. 231, 237-38 (1989).
52. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2)(E) (1988) (Commission shall promulgate general policy
statements regarding the appropriate use of plea agreements under FED. R. GRIM. P.
1 l(e)(2)).
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of the Guidelines specifically to plea agreements. 53 It opted not to make
major changes in the pre-Guidelines plea agreement practices, but in-
stead issued general policy statements concerning the acceptance of
plea agreements. 5 4 These statements provide two significant directives
to district courts. First, they allow a court to accept the dismissal of a
charge only when the remaining charges reflect the seriousness of the
real offense. 5 5 Second, they require the court to determine whether dis-
missal of charges will undermine the statutory purposes of the Guide-
lines. 56 Two other rules mandated by Congress went into effect when
the Guidelines were implemented: the Act provided for limited appel-
late review of sentencing decisions 57 and abolished early release on
parole.
5 8
C. The Post-Guideline Era
The implementation of the Guidelines has had a significant effect
on sentencing practice. First, the use of narrow sentence ranges has lim-
ited judges' sentencing discretion.5 9 Second, the acceptance of charge
offense sentencing has reduced judges' ability to adapt an individualized
sentence to fit the actual crime. Third, the Guidelines only allow judges
to consider certain past criminal convictions when determining the
proper criminal history category. Fourth, for the purposes of judicial
review, a trial court must now provide reasons for imposing a particular
sentence when it chooses to depart from the Guidelines or when the
sentence range exceeds two years. 60 Finally, a real-time sentencing sys-
tem has been created. Since Congress abolished parole, with the excep-
tion of minimal time off for good behavior, 6 1 the sentence imposed will
be the sentence served.
62
The role of plea bargaining also has changed in the post-Guidelines
era. Before the Guidelines were accepted, a judge could accept a plea
agreement, then disregard the prosecutor's recommendation and im-
pose any sentence within the statutory limits. 6 3 In practice, many judges
accepted plea agreements in order to shorten the court's docket.64
53. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 6B.
54. Id § 6B1.2.
55. Id. § 6B1.2(a). See also United States v. Bos, 917 F.2d 1178 (9th Cir. 1990) (Guide-
lines send contradictory messages by requiring courts to accept only plea agreements that
reflect the seriousness of the conduct, while providing for departure when the crime of
conviction does not reflect the seriousness of the conduct); United States v. Henry, 893
F.2d 46 (3d Cir. 1990) (defendants need not be informed of applicable sentencing guide-
line range before plea is taken).
56. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 6B1.2.
57. 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (1988).
58. The Act repealed 18 U.S.C. § 4205, which provided for release on parole after
one-third of the sentence had been served. Pub. L. 98-473, § 281(a)(5), 98 Stat. 2027
(1984).
59. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 367.
60. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (1988).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (1988).
62. Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 51, at 237.
63. Schulhofer, supra note 30, at 10-11.
64. Id. at 11 n.10.
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Under the old system, the judge's discretion to tailor a sentence to the
actual offense, as opposed to the charged offense, was a useful check on
prosecutorial plea bargaining power. The implementation of the Guide-
lines and the Mistretta decision created a different sentencing system
with new methods of administering sentences and accepting plea agree-
ments. Judges no longer have the discretion to select a sentence based
on circumstances that have been plea bargained away,65 and Congress
has eliminated early release on parole. Prosecutorial discretion now re-
mains virtually unfettered. 66 As a result, the prosecutor's plea bargain-
ing role has become more powerful.
These changes made judges reluctant to accept the Guidelines.
Many had doubts about the constitutionality of the Guidelines and re-
fused to apply them.67 In all, over two hundred district court judges
held the Guidelines unconstitutional, 68 while approximately 120 judges
adhered to them.69 This conflict continued untilJanuary 18, 1989 when
the United States Supreme Court, in an eight-to-one decision, declared
the Sentencing Guidelines constitutional. 70 After that date, all federal
courts were bound to follow the new sentencing rules.
III. UNITED STATES V. JACKSON
A. Facts and Procedural History
On July 5, 1988, the defendant, Leonard Brady Jackson, was ar-
rested in Oklahoma for possession of firearms by a felon, possession of
ammunition by a felon, and possession with intent to distribute approxi-
mately one gram of cocaine.7 1 He was later indicted on the same
charges. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Jackson pled guilty to posses-
sion of ammunition by a felon.72 The government dismissed the other
two charges and agreed not to seek the enhanced fifteen-year mandatory
65. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1 at 1.5 (declaring policy of using charge offense sentenc-
ing instead of real offense sentencing).
66. Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 51, at 238.
67. See, e.g., United States v. Bolding, 683 F. Supp. 1003, 1005 (D. Md. 1988) (the Act
violates the separation of powers doctrine by transferring judicial power from the federal
courts to the Sentencing Commission), rev'd, 876 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Allen, 685 F. Supp. 827, 828 (N.D. Ala. 1988) (the Act is unconstitutional because it vio-
lates the separation ofpowers principle); United States v. Arnold, 678 F. Supp. 1463, 1469
(S.D. Cal. 1988) (the Act is unconstitutional because it designates the Commission, which
possesses executive powers and duties, as a part of the judicial branch). But see United
States v. Chambless, 680 F. Supp. 793, 795 (E.D. La. 1988) (the Act does not give the
Sentencing Commission "free rein to do as it pleases" and therefore does not unconstitu-
tionally delegate legislative authority); United States v. Ruiz-Villanueva, 680 F. Supp.
1411, 1417 (S.D. Cal. 1988) (because the Act contains "intelligible standards and state-
ments of purpose," it does not embody an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power).
68. Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 51, at 257 n.116.
69. Id.
70. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361.
71. Appellee's Supplemental Brief at 5, United States v. Jackson, 921 F.2d 985 (1Oth
Cir. 1990) (No. 89-6118).
72. Jackson, 921 F.2d at 987.
19921
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sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act.7 3
Prior to this arrest, Jackson had been arrested six times.74 These
arrests were for robbery and forgery in the 1960's; two counts for sale of
heroin in 1975; felon in possession of a firearm in 1978; reckless con-
duct with a firearm and carrying a loaded firearm in a motor vehicle in
1982; and three counts of shooting with intent to kill in 1983. He was
convicted of all charges except the 1978 firearm possession and two
counts of shooting with intent to kill in 1983. 7 5
The district court, believing that the Sentencing Guidelines were
unconstitutional, sentenced Jackson to the statutory maximum of five
years and applied a special assessment of fifty dollars. 76 At sentencing,
the court noted the defendant's extensive criminal history, which in-
volved both guns and drugs,77 and expressed concern about the cocaine
and firearms found in the defendant's apartment.
78
The defendant appealed the sentence 79 and the circuit court re-
manded the case for resentencing pursuant to the Mistretta decision.80
At resentencing, the judge chose to depart from the applicable Guide-
line range of four to ten months and sentenced Jackson to sixty months
confinement, two years supervised release, and a special assessment of
fifty dollars.81 The court explained the departure by noting Jackson's
extensive criminal history and the fact that his prior convictions, some of
which were excluded by the Guidelines, demonstrated a continuing
course of criminal conduct.
8 2
Jackson again appealed, stating that neither the departure nor the
degree of departure was justified.83 On appeal, a panel of three judges
upheld the trial court's sentencing decision.8 4 The defendant peti-
tioned for a rehearing en banc, which was granted.8 5
B. Holding and Rationale
The Tenth Circuit remanded the case to the sentencing court for a
more specific explanation of the departure from the Guidelines. 86 The
court stated that although the trial court had sufficiently described its
reasons for departure, it had not adequately explained the degree of
departure,8 7 and that the reviewing court needed "a base line from
73. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (1988).
74. Appellee's Supplemental Brief, supra note 71, at 6.
75. Id.
76. Jackson, 921 F.2d at 987.
77. Appellee's Supplemental Brief, supra note 71, at 10.
78. Jackson, 921 F.2d at 992.
79. Id. at 987.
80. Id.
81. Id at 988.
82. Id at 992.
83. Id at 988.
84. United States v.Jackson, 903 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir. 1990).
85. Jackson, 921 F.2d 985.
86. Id at 993.
87. Id at 992.
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which we can gauge the reasonableness of the degree of departure."8 8
In other words, the trial court had explained why it moved from criminal
history level III to criminal history level VI, but it had not provided a
reasonable justification for a sentence above level VI.8 9 The court rea-
soned that since category VI fits any offender with thirteen points or
more, the Commission intended cases reaching this category generally
to stay within its sentencing confines.90 ' Additionally, to uphold the
principles of proportionality and uniformity, the court held that the trial
court must rely on the Guidelines to find analogous levels and principles
to guide its degree of departure.9 1
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THEJACKSON CASE
A. Necessity of Standards
The ability to depart is a key feature of the Guidelines because it
allows a court to uphold Congress's goal of proportionality. 92 At the
same time, however, uniformity must be maintained. Therefore, the cir-
cuit courts must adopt standards governing departure. The appeals
courts have been generally consistent when determining what standard
should control departure,93 but they have diverged in their treatment of
departure above the highest criminal history category, category VI.
9 4
The most restrictive standard, which was used by the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits, requires the court to use the basic structure of the Guidelines
as a guide when determining the appropriate sentence range above
criminal history category VI.9 5 The First, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Cir-
cuits have adopted a less restrictive standard based on reasonableness. 96
Under this standard, the appeals court will determine if the sentence
88. Id at 993.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 992.
91. lId at 993.
92. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1988).
93. Theresa W. Karle & Thomas Sager, Are the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Meeting Con-
gressional Goals? An Empirical and Case Law Analysis, 40 EMORY LJ. 393, 422 (1991).
94. Id. at 423.
95. United States v. Schmude, 901 F.2d 555, 560 (7th Cir. 1990) (courts should use
the 10-15% increases authorized by the Guidelines to derive the proper sentence when
criminal history category VI underrepresents the defendant's criminal background);
United States v. Pearson; 900 F.2d 1357, 1362 (9th Cir. 1990) (departure should be mea-
sured by analogy to the Guidelines).
96. United States v. Brown, 899 F.2d 94, 98 (1st Cir. 1990) (trial court decision to
depart above criminal history category VI from the 3-9 month range to 21 months was
reasonable because the defendant had a "demonstrated penchant for criminality" not
fairly accounted for by the Guidelines); United States v. Harvey, 897 F.2d 1300, 1306 (5th
Cir) (affirming trial court decision to depart upward from the 18-24 month range to 60
months despite failure to explain the degree of departure and indicating that explanation
is necessary only for low criminal history categories), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 568 (1990);
United States v. Christoph, 904 F.2d 1036 (6th Cir. 1990) (trial court decision to depart
upward from the 33-41 month range to 60 months was reasonable since criminal history
category VI did not adequately represent defendant's criminal history), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 713 (1991); United States v. Simmons, 924 F.2d 187, 192 (11 th Cir. 1991) (departure
above criminal history category VI was reasonable based on the defendant's prior adult
criminal conduct).
1992]
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imposed is reasonable without requiring the trial judge to resort to anal-
ogy based on the structure of the Guidelines. 97 The Eighth Circuit has
implemented an even more lenient reasonableness standard, allowing
the trial court to use a great deal of discretion in determining the proper
sentence above criminal history category VI.98
In Jackson, the court significantly changed the Tenth Circuit view.
The Tenth Circuit originally adopted a reasonableness standard to con-
trol departures in United States v. White.9 9 The White opinion, however,
did not consider the issue of how a court should determine the proper
sentence range when criminal history category VI is inadequate. This
issue was deliberated in United States v. Bernhardt.100 In Bernhardt, the
Tenth Circuit adopted the reasonableness standard of the First, Fifth,
Sixth and Eleventh Circuits. Finding no guidance from the Sentencing
Commission, the Bernhardt court applied its "own judgment" to deter-
mine the reasonableness of a sentence imposed above criminal history
category VI. 10 1 In Jackson, the court abandoned this position and opted
for the more restrictive view expressed by the Seventh and Ninth Cir-
cuits. Citing the Seventh Circuit case of United States v. Schmude, 10 2 the
court stated that "the increments between the Guidelines ranges could
assist both the sentencing court and the reviewing court in gauging the
reasonableness of the degree of departure."
10 3
The Tenth Circuit should be applauded for adopting a standard
that requires close adherence to the Guidelines for departures above
criminal history category VI. Uniformity is more likely to be achieved
when the standard for departure requires judges to remain true to the
structure of the Guidelines. As demonstrated before the Guidelines
were implemented, judicial discretion leads to non-uniform sentenc-
ing. 10 4 Additionally, it has been argued that the sentencing Guidelines
will add to the already severe prison overcrowding problem.10 5 The
reasonableness standard established in Bernhardt would have exacer-
bated this problem because it would have resulted in proportionately
longer sentences. By adopting the more restrictive standard of Jackson,
the Tenth Circuit has held these problems to a minimum.
Nevertheless, the problem of non-uniformity among the circuits still
exists. Sentencing has only become uniform among the circuits that
97. Simmons, 924 F.2d at 191.
98. United States v. Hill, 911 F.2d 129, 130 (8th Cir. 1990) (trial court did not abuse
its discretion in departing above criminal history category VI based on the defendant's
extensive criminal history); United States v. Carey, 898 F.2d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 1990) (trial
court decision to depart upward from the 15-year range to 19 years was permissible be-
casue the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history and his incorrigibility were not
adequately reflected in his criminal history category).
99. 893 F.2d 276 (10th Cir. 1990).
100. 905 F.2d 343 (10th Cir. 1990).
101. Id. at 346.
102. 901 F.2d 555 (7th Cir. 1990).
103. Jackson, 921 F.2d at 993.
104. Supra notes 12-30 and accompanying text.
105. See generally Michael K. Block & William M. Rhodes, Forecasting the Impact of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 7 BEHAv. Sci. & LAW 51 (1989).
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have chosen similar standards. Either the other circuits should follow
the Tenth Circuit's lead and adopt the most sensible standard, or the
Supreme Court should grant certiorari. Otherwise, the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines perhaps should be renamed the Circuit Sentencing
Guidelines.
B. Necessity of Detailed Explanations When Sentencing
The increased specificity required by the court in Jackson will
achieve three desirable results: first, it will provide reviewable material
on appeal; second, it will establish precedent; and third, it will allow the
Commission to adjust and maintain the Guidelines.
Detailed explanations of departures by trial courts are necessary for
adequate review on appeal. Congress has empowered appeals courts to
review departure sentences for reasonableness, 10 6 but the determina-
tion of reasonableness must be based on the rationale advanced by the
trial court and not the appeals court's own post hoc reasoning. 10 7 Un-
less the trial court articulates its rationale, the appeals court cannot ef-
fectively review the sentencing process.' 0 8 If courts of appeal were
unable to review the basis of a departure decision, trial courts would be
able to depart from them indiscriminately. This would render the
Guidelines useless, and sentencing would revert back to the pre-Guide-
lines system. 10 9 Such a reversion would be directly opposed to Con-
gressional intent. 110
A detailed description of departures will also provide the basis for
common law precedent. 1 11 Each time a trial court departs from the
Guidelines, it is setting common law precedent. Having a detailed rec-
ord to follow will aid future judges in determining when departure is
acceptable. Finally, a particular reason for departure that becomes per-
vasive may be included in the Guidelines. Congress empowered the
Commission to monitor the sentencing process and adjust the Guide-
lines where necessary. 1 12 Records of trial court reasoning allow the
Commission to identify common departures and consider whether that
reasoning should be incorporated in the Guidelines. By ensuring that
the sentencing process is open to study, evaluation, and review, written
opinions will help preserve good faith and rational suppport for a guide-
line system. '1 3
106. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(4) (1988).
107. United States v. Dean, 908 F.2d 1491, 1497 (10th Cir. 1990) (case remanded for
failure to explain departure sentence adequately).
108. United States v. Gardner, 905 F.2d 1432, 1436 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
202 (1990).
109. See United States v. Ferra, 900 F.2d 1057, 1062 (7th Cir. 1990) ("Unless there is
discipline in determining the amount of departure . . . sentencing disparity will
reappear.").
110. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1988).
111. See Marc Miller, Guidelines Are Not Enough: The Needfor Written Sentencing Opinions, 7
BEHAv. Sci. & LAw 3, 20-21 (1989).
112. 28 U.S.C. § 995 (1988).
113. Miller, supra note 111, at 21.
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C. The Role of Plea Bargaining
Although the Jackson court should be applauded for adjusting the
standard governing degree of departure and for requiring more detailed
explanations for departures, it seems to have ignored the role of plea
bargaining. Because of the timing of this case, the court effectively in-
termingled the new and the old sentencing systems. A plea agreement
was reached under the pre-Guidelines system, 1 4 yet the trial court was
required to support the sentence under the standard of the post-Guide-
lines system.' 1 5 Under the old system, the trial court could consider
facts included in the charges dismissed by the plea agreement.
116
Under the new system, it could only consider aggravating circumstances
that were related to the charged offense.
1 17
By failing to recognize the effect of the Guidelines on plea agree-
ments,11 8 the Jackson court has set a precedent for the intermingling of
law in similar cases. Any subsequent cases that were plea bargained
before Mistretta, but sentenced after, will put the sentencing power in the
hands of the prosecutors. This outcome could have been avoided, had
the court allowed for reconsideration of the plea agreement on remand.
The trial court then could have exercised its power to accept or reject
the plea bargain and impose an appropriate sentence.
V. CONCLUSION
The goals of the United States Sentencing Guidelines were to in-
crease uniformity and maintain proportionality in the sentencing pro-
cess. To maintain proportionality, the Guidelines allow for departure
from the prescribed sentencing ranges. To achieve uniformity, it is es-
sential that judges write detailed sentencing opinions and that appeals
courts validate or invalidate those opinions based on strict standards.
Those standards should be uniform among the circuits. The Jackson
court acknowledged this need by applying a strict standard to sentences
that depart above criminal history category VI. It would be in the best
interest of society if the circuits not already applying this standard would
follow suit.
J. Kevin Ray
114. Jackson, 921 F.2d at 987; see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
116. At sentencing, the court noted the defendant's extensive criminal history involv-
ing guns and drugs and expressed concern about the cocaine and firearms involved in the
current charges. Appellee's Supplemental Brief, supra note 71, at 10. At resentencing, the
court noted that the defendant's prior convictions were not adequately taken into consid-
eration under the Guidelines. Jackson, 921 F.2d at 992.
117. U.S.S.G., supra note'l, § 5K2.0 (1989). The Guidelines no longer require that the
aggravating circumstances be related to the charged offense. U.S.S.G., supra note 1,
§ 5K2.0 (1990).
118. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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